University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Departmental Papers (CIS)

Department of Computer & Information Science

8-23-2010

A Safety-Assured Development Approach for Real-Time Software
Eunkyoung Jee
University of Pennsylvania, eunkjee@seas.upenn.edu

Shaohui Wang
University of Pennsylvania, shaohui@seas.upenn.edu

Jeong Ki Kim
University of Pennsylvania, jeongki@seas.upenn.edu

Jaewoo Lee
University of Pennsylvania, jaewoo@seas.upenn.edu

Oleg Sokolsky
University of Pennsylvania, sokolsky@cis.upenn.edu

See next page for additional authors

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Eunkyoung Jee, Shaohui Wang, Jeong Ki Kim, Jaewoo Lee, Oleg Sokolsky, and Insup Lee, "A SafetyAssured Development Approach for Real-Time Software", 16th IEEE International Conference on
Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications (RTCSA '10) , 133-142. August 2010.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/RTCSA.2010.42

The 16th IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and Applications
(RTCSA), Aug. 23-25, 2010.
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/430
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

A Safety-Assured Development Approach for Real-Time Software
Abstract
Guaranteeing timing properties is an important issue as we develop safety-critical real-time systems such
as cardiac pacemakers. We present a safety assured development approach of real-time software using a
pacemaker as our case study. Following the model-driven development techniques, measurement-based
timing analysis is used to guarantee timing properties in implementation as well as in the formal model.
Formal specification with timed automata is checked with respect to timing properties by model checking
technique and is transformed into implementation systematically. When timing properties may be
violated in the implementation due to timing delay, it is suggested to measure the time deviation and
reflect it to the code explicitly by modifying guards. The model is altered according to the modifications in
the code. These changes of the code and the model are considered safe if all the properties are still
satisfied by the modified model in re-performed model hecking. We demonstrate how the suggested
approach can be applied to single-threaded and multi-threaded versions of implementation. This
approach can provide developers with a useful time-guaranteeing technique applicable to several code
generation schemes without imposing many restrictions.

Keywords
real-time software, timed automata, formal verification, code generation, timing analysis

Disciplines
Computer Sciences

Comments
The 16th IEEE International Conference on Embedded and Real-Time Computing Systems and
Applications (RTCSA), Aug. 23-25, 2010.

Author(s)
Eunkyoung Jee, Shaohui Wang, Jeong Ki Kim, Jaewoo Lee, Oleg Sokolsky, and Insup Lee

This conference paper is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/cis_papers/430

A Safety-Assured Development Approach for Real-Time Software
Eunkyoung Jee, Shaohui Wang, Jeong Ki Kim, Jaewoo Lee, Oleg Sokolsky, Insup Lee
Department of Computer and Information Science
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, USA
Email: {eunkjee, shaohui, jeongki, jaewoo}@seas.upenn.edu, {sokolsky, lee}@cis.upenn.edu

Abstract—Guaranteeing timing properties is an important
issue as we develop safety-critical real-time systems such as
cardiac pacemakers. We present a safety assured development
approach of real-time software using a pacemaker as our case
study. Following the model-driven development techniques,
measurement-based timing analysis is used to guarantee timing
properties in implementation as well as in the formal model.
Formal specification with timed automata is checked with
respect to timing properties by model checking technique and is
transformed into implementation systematically. When timing
properties may be violated in the implementation due to timing
delay, it is suggested to measure the time deviation and reflect it
to the code explicitly by modifying guards. The model is altered
according to the modifications in the code. These changes of
the code and the model are considered safe if all the properties
are still satisfied by the modified model in re-performed model
checking. We demonstrate how the suggested approach can
be applied to single-threaded and multi-threaded versions of
implementation. This approach can provide developers with a
useful time-guaranteeing technique applicable to several code
generation schemes without imposing many restrictions.
Keywords-real-time software; timed automata; formal verification; code generation; timing analysis;

I. I NTRODUCTION
When we develop a real-time system, guaranteeing timing
properties on its implementation is an important but nontrivial issue. It becomes essential if the real-time system is
a safety-critical one in which violation of timing properties
can result in fatal loss of properties or life.
Focusing on how to implement time-guaranteed real-time
software from the model systematically, we propose a safetyassured development approach of real-time software. We
demonstrate the proposed approach using cardiac pacemaker
software, representative of life-critical real-time systems
in which many complex timing constraints are imposed.
This work also was motivated from the Pacemaker Grand
Challenge, the first certification challenge problem issued
by the Software Certification Consortium (SCC) [1].
Several concepts and approaches can be effectively integrated to contribute to the development of safety-assured
real-time software. We basically follow the model-driven development (MDD) concept which is considered a promising
methodology and is applied in the development of embedded
software. According to the MDD concept, we create a

formal model of the real-time system, verify the model, and
generate an implementation code from the model. In order
to check and guarantee timing constraints on the implementation, we perform measurement-based timing analysis on
the implementation and revise the implementation and the
model according to the timing analysis result.
Formal methods have been used as a promising approach
to assure software quality. We start the proposed safetyassured development approach by taking the software specification and creating a timed automata model capturing
the requirements. The model is formally verified by the
model checking technique using the real-time model checker
U PPAAL [2] with respect to properties extracted from requirements specification.
After obtaining a timed automata model which has been
proven correct, an implementation code is synthesized from
the timed automata. Code generation from timed automata
has been studied in [3]–[5]. In [3], the T IMES tool generates
executable C code for the Lego MindstormsTM [6] from
timed automata extended with tasks. The code is generated
assuming the synchrony hypothesis which says that the
underlying machine is infinitely fast and the reaction of the
system to an input event is instantaneous. The assumption of
synchrony hypothesis is helpful in simplifying the behavioral
specifications of reactive systems, but unrealistic. An implementation can only react within a non-zero reaction delay
while timed automata is assumed to react instantaneously to
events and time-outs according to the classical semantics of
timed automata. The properties proved on the model are not
guaranteed to be preserved by the code generation scheme
of [3].
In [4], authors presented a tool set which enables automatic generation of provably correct code from verified
timed automata models. It is guaranteed that the verified
timing properties in the model with the almost ASAP
semantics [7] are preserved in the generated code without
assuming the synchrony hypothesis, under the condition
that δ < 3∆L + 4∆P where δ, ∆L , ∆P represents the
reaction delay of the controller, time length of an execution
loop, and time between two clock ticks, respectively. Their
approach and tool set is quite promising, but obtaining
benefits of preservation of timing properties requires many

assumptions be fulfilled ahead. For example, no shared
continuous variables between automata are allowed in their
approach. Shared variables should be modeled by discrete
events because only events are visible by multiple automata.
While we try to answer how preservation of timing
properties can be achieved in the implementation with minor
changes of the code even when the original implementation is based on assumption of synchrony hypothesis, we
propose a framework for time-guaranteed code generation
applicable to any systematic code generation scheme in
which concrete relation between the timed automata model
and the generated code can be identified. Our focus is
neither proposing a new code generation scheme from timed
automata nor providing complete guarantees of all types of
timing properties. We provide developers with a useful timeguaranteeing technique applicable to any systematic code
generation approaches without imposing many restrictions.
We implement the pacemaker software by synthesizing
code from the timed automata assuming the synchrony
hypothesis. Once the code is obtained, we check to see
if timing properties hold on the code by inserting instrumentation code. Timing properties requiring zero reaction
delay are usually violated by the code although they are
satisfied by the model. For the violated properties, we
profile time-consuming operations like reading a clock and
wating/posting a semaphore as well as execution of our
implementation, and then determine a ∆ which we will call
timing tolerance in this paper. The ∆ is used to revise the
code by enlarging guards to ensure that the revised code
satisfies the previously violated properties.
Then, developers check whether the revised code is safe
by making corresponding changes back to the model and
performing model checking again with respect to the properties. If all the properties are still satisfied on the modified
model, the code including the timing tolerance is considered
to guarantee timing properties safely. When the modified
model fails to meet all the properties, analysis of the violated
cases can provide developers with highly useful information
with respect to property preservation. For example, guaranteeing one property may conflict with guaranteeing another
property; here, the code may not guarantee timing properties
even with enlarged guards.
We experiment with two different code generation
schemes, one based on a single-threaded structure and the
other based on a multi-threaded structure, to see how the
proposed approach can work with different code generation
structures.
The main contribution of this paper is the methodology
for development of safety-assured real-time software. In
order to preserve timing properties transferred from the
verified model to the implementation, the model-driven development process is complemented by measurement-based
timing analysis, revision of implementation and modeling
with timing tolerances, and revisting model checking. We

illustrate that this methodology can be effectively used for
the development of time-critical software with a pacemaker
case study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II explains the background of the case study.
Section III presents the overview of the proposed process
and demonstrates formal modeling and verification of the
pacemaker software. Section IV explains code generation,
timing analysis on the code, and the re-checking process.
We discuss related issues in Section V and present a review
of previous works related to topics addressed in this paper
in Section VI. We conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. C ASE S TUDY: PACEMAKER S OFTWARE
A. Heart
A human heart has four chambers: right and left atria,
and right and left ventricles. De-oxygenated blood from the
body is collected in the right atrium and then pumped into
the lungs via the right ventricle. In the lungs, carbon dioxide
in the blood is replaced with oxygen. This oxygenated
blood then passes through the left atrium and enters the left
ventricle, which pumps it out to the rest of the body.
From an electrical point of view, the heart is a pump made
up of muscle tissue, controlled by an intrinsic electrical system. An electrical stimulus generated periodically (normally
about 60-100 times per minute) by the sinus node, located
in the right atrium, travels through the conduction pathways
and causes the heart’s chambers to contract and pump out
blood. The atria are stimulated and contract shortly before
the ventricles are stimulated and contract.
Under some conditions, this intrinsic cardiac system does
not work properly and the heart rate becomes overly fast
or slow, or irregular. In these situations, the body may not
receive enough blood, which causes several symptoms such
as low blood pressure, weakness, and fatigue. To avoid these
symptoms, a pacemaker can be used to regulate the heartbeat
[8].
B. Pacemaker
A cardiac pacemaker is an electronic device implanted
into the body to regulate the heart beat by delivering electrical stimuli over leads with electrodes that are in contact with
the heart. These stimuli are called paces. The pacemaker
may also detect natural cardiac stimulations, called senses.
We refer to cardiac paces and senses collectively as events.
A pacemaker must satisfy three fundamental medical
requirements: the rate at which the cardiac chambers contract
must not be too high; the rate at which the cardiac chambers
contract must not be too low; the ventricles must contract
at a particular interval after the atria contract. These general
requirements are concretized by setting specific values or
ranges to configurable parameters for the pacemaker.
In this paper, we are concerned with non-rate-adaptive
operating modes of a pacemaker; that is, those modes which

do not change their pulse rate depending on the natural rate
of the patient. There are ten such modes, each associated
with a set of parameters that can be configured by a
physician. Each of these modes is identified using a threeletter acronym. The first letter refers to the chambers of
the heart that will be paced by the pacemaker. This letter
may be V, A, D, or O representing Ventricle, Atrium, Dual
(both chambers), or None, respectively. The second letter
refers to the chambers of the heart that will be sensed by
the pacemaker. As with the first letter, this may be V, A,
D, or O. The third letter describes the pacemaker’s response
to sensing. This may be T, I, D, or O representing Triggers
Pacing, Inhibits Pacing, Dual (T + I), or None, respectively.
For example, a pacemaker in VVI mode paces and senses in
the ventricle; pacing is inhibited when the pacemaker gets
sensing. A pacemaker in DDD mode paces and senses in
both the atrium and the ventricle; pacing is inhibited in the
atrial channel by sensed ventricular or atrial activity and is
inhibited in the ventricular channel by ventricular activity
but triggered by sensing atrial activity [9].
C. VVI Mode Pacemaker
Among ten non-rate-adaptive operating modes, we consider a pacemaker software in VVI mode which is simple
but useful to help understand and analyze timing constraints.
VVI mode pacemaker senses spontaneous ventricular signals
from a human heart. It can deliver electrical stimuli or
ventricular paces over leads implanted in a patient heart. A
ventricular sensing signal results in inhibiting a scheduled
ventricular pacing signal. VVI mode pacemaker has an
internal clock or lower rate timing cycle that begins with
a paced or sensed ventricular event. The initial portion
of the cycle consists of the ventricular refractory period
(VRP), usually 200-350 ms. VRP is a period following each
ventricular pace during which ventricular sensing is disabled
to prevent a sudden pacing caused by an unexpected sense.
The pacemaker cannot sense any signals during VRP. More
specifically, any signal during the VRP cannot initiate a new
lower rate interval (LRI) which is the maximum amount
of time between two consecutive events in one chamber.
Beyond the VRP, a sensed ventricular event inhibits the
pacemaker and resets the LRI so that the timing clock returns
to the baseline. A new pacing cycle is initiated and if no
event is sensed, the timing cycle ends with the release of a
ventricular stimulus according to the LRI. When hysteresis
pacing mode is on (in conjunction with VVI mode), the
pacemaker will give the human heart a chance of resuming
to continuous normal operation by setting LRI to a larger
value, namely the hysteresis rate interval (HRI).
III. F ORMAL M ODELING AND V ERIFICATION
A. Overall Process
We propose a safety-assured development process for realtime software. The proposed process follows the model-

driven development approach with the emphasis on how
to ensure that the implementation satisfies timing properties
which has been satisfied in model. Figure 1 shows the overall
process.
During the requirements and design phases of the software
life cycle, developers first start from formal modeling with
timed automata of the real-time software. Second, model
checking is performed on the timed automata model with
respect to desired properties using a real-time model checker
such as U PPAAL. We focus on safety properties, especially
timing properties which require that a certain event should
happen no later than a specific delay. Given a formal
model proven correct with respect to the properties, an
implementation code is synthesized in the third step.
In the fourth step, we check to see if the same properties
checked on the model are still satisfied by the code running
on a target platform. If some timing properties are not
satisfied by the code, we measure how much actual time
deviates from the expected. During the fourth step, we find
a timing tolerance value, ∆, through the measurement-based
timing analysis. Guards in the code become relaxed with
this ∆ to make timing properties satisfied by the code.
Once it is confirmed that the code satisfies the desired
timing properties with the ∆, changes of the code, i.e.,
relaxed guards with the ∆, are reflected to the model in
the fifth step. If the modified model still satisfies all the
properties, the overall process ends. Otherwise, the process
is repeated by revising the problematic model and the code.
We will describe each step with the pacemaker example in
the following subsections.
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life cycle
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Figure 1. Overall process of a safety-assured development for a real-time
pacemaker software

B. Formal Modeling
We used the Boston Scientific’s system specification for a
pacemaker [10]. Because timing constraints are so prevalent
in the specification of the pacemaker, it is intuitive and
straightforward to use timed automata [11] as our modeling
language. Here we use the U PPAAL tool [2] to specify a
timed automata model of the pacemaker in VVI mode.

is paced or sensed, current state is changed to WaitVRP
WaitVRP: In this state the pacemaker does nothing
but waiting for a VRP period to end. It returns to the
WaitRI state after a VRP period by setting hpenable
to hp and started to true. hpenable and started are
auxiliary variables to be used in property description
for model checking.
2) Heart Model: The second automaton, Heart, shown
in Figure 2(b), simulates a human heart. It is an environment
for us to simulate and verify the pacemaker software in
modeling phase. There is only one state, Ready, where the
heart waits a ventricular pacing event from the pacemaker or
randomly sends a ventricular sensing event to the pacemaker
during time interval between lower bound (minwait) and
higher bound (maxwait) for two consecutive heart beats.
Once it sees an event in the channel VPace or VSense
in the Ready state, it goes to the Ready state again by
resetting the clock.
•

(a) Ventricle controller model

(b) Heart model
Figure 2.

Uppaal model for a pacemaker in VVI mode

We extracted properties to be satisfied by the VVI mode
pacemaker from the system specification. LRI, HRI, and
VRP are considered most important timing periods which
should be guaranteed by the VVI mode pacemaker. Figure 2
shows two automata for Ventricle and Heart, representing a
ventricle controller of the VVI mode pacemaker and a heart
model as an environment, respectively.
1) Ventricle Model: Ventricle automaton shown in Figure
2(a) captures sensing signals from the ventricle of the heart
and emitting ventricular pacing signals to the heart. Three
important timing periods LRI, HRI, and VRP were captured
in this automaton. The constants for timing intervals can be
various from patients to patients. Normal values of these
constants are 1000ms for LRI, 1200ms for HRI, and 320ms
for VRP.
Event channels are used to communicate between different components of the system. The primary channels are
VPace and VSense representing channels for paces and
senses in the ventricle, respectively. There are two states
WaitRI and WaitVRP in the Ventricle timed automaton in
Figure 2(a).
• WaitRI: The pacemaker starts from this state and waits
for a ventricular sensing or pacing event. If sensing
does not occur before RI period ends, the ventricle
controller sends a pacing signal to the heart and the
timer x is reset. RI value turns into LRI and hp is set
to false. hp is a boolean value for setting hysteresis
pacing. When the hysteresis pacing is applied (i.e., hp
is true), the pacemaker provides a longer period (i.e.,
HRI) following a sensing event before pacing. hp is
set to true after every ventricular sensing or false after
every ventricular pacing. It determines whether LRI and
HRI will be assigned to RI. For Transition 2, when a
ventricular sense occurs, the timer x is reset, HRI is
assigned to RI and hp is set to true. Once the ventricle

C. Formal Verification
We mapped the timing requirements to corresponding
verification queries in U PPAAL. For easy reference to the
properties, we labeled a unique name to each property. These
are four properties which we used in verification:
• PropDeadlock: Deadlock freeness
A[] (not deadlock)
This property is checked to make sure that there are no
deadlocks in any execution sequences.
• PropLRI: Lower Rate Limit under disabled Hysteresis
Pacing
A[] (!Ventricle.hpenable imply
Ventricle.x <= Ventricle.LRI)
When the hysteresis pacing is disabled (i.e.,
Ventricle.hpenable is false), RI should be
the value of LRI. The pacemaker should trigger a
ventricular pace before RI period expires, if the heart
does not beat by itself.
• PropHRI: Hysteresis Rate Limit under enabled
Hysteresis Pacing
A[] (Ventricle.hpenable imply
Ventricle.x <= Ventricle.HRI)
When the hysteresis pacing is enabled, the pacemaker
uses a pre-defined value HRI instead of LRI after
every sensing. In the hysteresis-enabled status, the
pacemaker should trigger a ventricular pace before
HRI period expires, if the heart does not beat by itself.
• PropVRP: Ventricular Refractory Period
A[] ((Ventricle.WaitRI &&
Ventricle.started) imply
Ventricle.x >= Ventricle.VRP)
The pacemaker should turn off ventricular sensing
for a VRP period after any ventricular pacing or
sensing event. In our model, the timer Ventricle.x
is reset whenever the ventricular pacing or sensing

event happens. Therefore, we can check whether
the ventricular controller follows the VRP period
requirement or not by checking whether it stays in
the WaitRI state for at least VRP period when the
pacemaker detects a ventricular sensing or pacing
event (i.e., Ventricle.started is true).
When we performed model checking on the model shown in
Figure 2 with the above four properties, we confirmed that
the model satisfied all these properties.
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IV. C ODE S YNTHESIS AND T IMING A NALYSIS
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We implemented the pacemaker software on a hardware
reference platform of the Pacemaker Formal Method Challenge [1], which is based on a Microchip 8-bit PIC18F4520
MicroController Unit (PIC18 MCU) [12] running at 40 MHz
clock speed. We generated two flavors of implementation
code from the timed automata model. One is a singlethreaded code where the timed automata models are implemented inside a large loop. The single-threaded code checks
the current enabled transitions and takes one of them in each
iteration. The other is a multi-threaded code where each
transition in timed automata is implemented by an individual
thread.
The multi-threaded approach used functionalities supported by the operating system called PICos18 [13] for the
PIC18 MCU while the single-threaded approach did not use
any operating system supports. The MPLAB C Compiler
for PIC18 MCUs was used to compile these implementation
codes.
We utilized MPLAB SIM, a software simulator for PIC18
MCU in MPLAB Integrated Development Environment
(IDE) [12] to execute the code and measure timing aspects of
it. With MPLAB, we can set the CPU frequency to various
values. The faster the CPU is, the more instantly the program
responds to an event. We select our simulator parameters to
model the behavior of a minimal possible CPU. In practice,
more powerful CPUs may be used and correctness and safety
requirement hold.
A. Single-threaded Approach
1) Code Generation: This single-threaded code structure
was inspired by techniques used in T IMES tool [14] which
supports code synthesis from timed automata extended with
tasks for Lego MindstormsTM platform. While we use their
basic code structure, we target a different platform, PIC18
MCU board and consider only timed automata without tasks.
The check_trans function includes the main algorithm. It checks all the transitions for every automaton, takes
one transition if the guard holds, and loops until there are
no more transitions to take. Listing 1 is a pseudo-code for
the check_trans.
1
2
3

function check_trans
for each trn do
if (trn is active) and (eval_guard(trn))

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

if (there is synchronization)
if (compl_trn exists) and (eval_guard(
compl_trn))
read test clock; /* verification
purpose */
update variables of both trn and
compl_trn;
take both trn and comp_trn to new
states;
perform verification and print
results; /* verification
purpose */
set trn to -1; /* to check all
outgoing transitions again */
end if
else /* no synchronization */
update variables of trn;
take the transition trn to new state;
set trn to -1;
end if
end if
end for
Listing 1.

The modified function check_trans

The function check_trans is executed repeatedly as
long as the system progresses. For each transition trn, the
check_trans first checks whether the trn is active, i.e.,
whether it is an outgoing transition of the current location.
If the trn is active and its guard evaluates to true, the
check_trans examines whether there exists synchronization for this transition. If there is synchronization, it examines whether the complementary transition compl_trn is
also active and the guard of the compl_trn evaluates to
true. If these conditions are true, variables of both the trn
and the compl_trn are updated and finally both transitions
are taken. If no synchronization is involved, only trn is
taken.
The system model may have several automata and states,
and hence there may be a lot of transitions. However,
each automaton has only one current state and outgoing
transitions from the current state are usually not many. Most
transitions do not go into over Line 5 in Listing 1. Thus, it
does not take a long time to go over all transitions of the
system.
2) Checking Timing Constraints:
Testing scenarios: In order to check whether the running pacemaker code satisfies the timing properties which
have been verified in the model, we created a set of test
scenarios by considering various possible sequences of interactions between heart and the pacemaker. We used interrupts
to simulate signals from heart in MPLAB SIM. For the
VVI mode pacemaker, at least five different scenarios are
possible.
• Pacing–Pacing: when a patient heart does not send
ventricular signals, a VVI mode pacemaker generates
ventricular pacing signals every 1000ms continuously
if LRI is set to 1000ms.
• Pacing–Sensing (during VRP): a pacemaker ignores
any incorrect sensing signals during VRP after pacing;

sensing signals occurring during VRP do not affect the
behavior of the pacemaker.
• Pacing–Sensing (after VRP): if a patient heart becomes
able to make spontaneous ventricle signals after being
paced, a VVI mode pacemaker can sense these ventricular signals after VRP.
• Sensing–Pacing: whenever a single, non-refractory
sensed ventricular event occurs, it shall activate hysteresis pacing; thus, a VVI mode pacemaker waits for HRI,
longer than LRI, before making next pacing signal.
• Sensing–Sensing: if a patient heart makes consecutive
sensing signals, a VVI mode pacemaker inhibits scheduled ventricle pacing signals; it waits for HRI before
making next pacing signal.
Checking method and result: We checked three timing
properties PropLRI, PropHRI, and PropVRP by inserting
instrumentation code. Because all three timing properties
are simple safety properties which should be satisfied in
all states, we put the property checking code at the end
of the for loop as shown in Line 9 in Listing 1. We
used a sequence of if-then-else statements for the property
checking. For example, the following is a part of perform
verification code to check PropLRI:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

if( RI is LRI )
if( timer <= LRI )
print (TL: time_stamp)
else
print (FL: time_stamp)
end if
end if

TL means that PropLRI is satisfied (true) and FL means that
PropLRI is not satisfied (false). We read a value of the test
clock right before the program updates variables.
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

Heart Event (ms)
P:1000.960
P:1000.448
S:910.464
S:1059.328
P:1200.832
P:1000.448

VRP
–
–
Yes
Yes
–
–

LRI
No
No
–
–
–
No

HRI
–
–
–
–
No
–

Table I
C HECKING RESULT OF SINGLE - THREADED CODE

Table I shows a summary of the program output. The
first column is the sequential number of program output.
The second column shows times, measured in millisecond,
when sensing (S) or pacing (P) signals are detected. The rest
columns show which properties among PropVRP, PropLRI,
and PropHRI are relevant to the test scenario and how the
checking results are. A dash means that the corresponding
property is not relevant to the scenario. It is shown that
the properties PropLRI and PropHRI which require that the
pacemaker deliver pacing events no later than LRI (1000ms
in our setting) and HRI (1200ms in our setting), respectively,

did not hold. For example, the first row shows that the
PropLRI was not satisfied because the pacing signal was
delivered at 1000.960ms which is later than 1000ms. On
the other hand, the property PropVRP which requires that
sensing be detected only after VRP (320ms in our setting)
always held.
Timing analysis: From the analysis of the violated
properties, we found that code execution time is not ignorable in the aspect of property preservation for the pacemaker
software. We also found that all the deviations from the
expected time were less than 1ms in our experiment, as
shown in TableI.
In order to get better understanding about the impact of
code execution time to timing property preservation, we
measured how much time is spent on execution of each piece
of code in check_trans. By using the stopwatch functionality provided by the MPLAB IDE [12], we measured
time periods between two breakpoints of the code and the
whole execution time of the program. We tested the Pacing–
Pacing scenario to measure execution time of each piece
of the code. The Pacing–Pacing scenario consists of three
phases of execution as follows:
• Before Pacing: this is a period between consecutive
pacing signals; the program checks Transition 0 to
Transition 3 in Figure 2(a) and 2(b) since enabled states
are Ready and WaitRI, and repeats this checking of
transitions for 1000ms.
• Pacing: at this moment, the pacemaker software delivers a pacing signal and takes the transition to WaitVRP state; it also prints a result such as P (FL:
1000.448ms) on screen.
• During VRP: the pacemaker does nothing but checks
Transition 0, 1, and 4 in Figure 2(a) and 2(b), and
repeats this for VRP (320ms).
When we measured time of each phase of the above scenario using the stopwatch feature, we obtained the following
result of time measurement.
Before pacing: 1.070ms
Pacing: 25.054ms
Before printing “P”: 1.871ms
Pacing (printing “P”): 2.175ms
Verification including printing: 20.372ms
After pacing: 628us
During VRP: 628us
Re-checking result: We modified our code according
to the above analysis. We chose 2ms, among values greater
than 1ms, as the value of timing tolerance ∆ and did
the experiment again. Specifically, our modified code now
actually implements a model which differs from the model in
Figure 2(a) slightly in which Transition 2 now has a guard
of x >= RI − ∆ rather than the original x >= RI. It
means that the implementation will be able to check the

guard of the respective transition 2ms earlier; thus, making
a pacing event no later than RI becomes possible, resulting
in satisfying the corresponding timing property. Note that
we did not change the guard of Transition 4 because the
PropVRP was never violated. Only transitions relevant to
the violated PropLRI and PropHRI were changed.
Table II is the result of enforcing 2ms timing tolerance
in the program. We can now see that all of three timing
properties are satisfied with the modified guards with the
timing tolerance. Last but not the least, to validate the
#
1
2
3
4
5
6

Heart Event (ms)
P:998.880
P:998.720
S:793.760
S:1000.704
P:1198.204
P:998.496

VRP
–
–
Yes
Yes
–
–

LRI
Yes
Yes
–
–
–
Yes

HRI
–
–
–
–
Yes
–

semaphore for the location from which the corresponding
transition starts. It then will check the guard by reading the
clock value, waiting for input event signal semaphores, if
any, and evaluating Boolean guards. If the guard is false,
the thread will repeat the above logic. If the guard is true,
it will execute the associated actions, including updating
shared variables, resetting clocks, posting semaphores for
output signals, and switching locations (changing a process
variable cur_loc indicating the current location of the
automaton, as well as posting respective semaphores). This
scheme can be described with pseudo-code in Listing 2.1
With this scheme, we can systematically generate code
(though currently manually) for the multi-threaded approach.
1

3
4
5

Table II

6

R ECHECKING RESULT OF SINGLE - THREADED CODE

7
8
9

changes in the code, we also propagate changes backward
to the models. With the timing tolerance value ∆, we
verified all the properties on the modified model again. The
result showed that all the properties were still satisfied. This
result confirmed that the change of the code does not harm
preservation of all the desired timing properties.
B. Multi-threaded Approach
There are at least two schemes to employ multiple threads
to synthesize code for timed automata models. One is
to implement the behavior of each timed automaton in
one thread, and communications between channels of these
timed automata are implemented using thread communications provided by the underlying operating system running
on the board. In another approach, inspired by the generated
code from E LASTIC 2B RICK tool [4], the transition functions
run in individual threads and are triggered by events sent to
the respective threads.
1) Code Generation: The E LASTIC 2B RICK tool can produce C code for L EGO M INDSTORMSTM running B RICKOS
from timed automata models without invariants. Since it
does not support shared variables and we are targeting
PIC18 MCU platform [12], we did not use E LASTIC 2B RICK
directly but implemented our U PPAAL models in a manual
but systematic scheme similar to the structure of the code
automatically generated by the E LASTIC 2B RICK tool. With
thread support in PIC18 MCU’s operating system PICos18
[13], our approach implements shared variables as process
variables, which can be accessed by all threads in the hosting
process.
In our code generation scheme, each transition of an
automaton is transformed into a single thread. The structure
for such a thread is as follows. The thread will wait for the

task Template

2

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

while true
WaitEvent(CURR_LOC_EVENT);
ClearEvent(CURR_LOC_EVENT);
thread specific calculation
sleep when necessary
if ((sleeping is used) and
(cur_loc is changed when waking up))
cancel transition
else
update variables
clear timer when necessary
change to destination location
SetEvent(DEST_task_ID, EVENT_ID);
perform verification
end if
end while
Listing 2.

Task Template

The variable cur_loc is used to check if the automaton
is still at the same location when it wakes up from sleeping
(corresponding to waiting for a certain period in the model).
For example, in the ventricle controller model in Figure 2(a),
Transition 2 and Transition 3 may both happen when the
automaton is in the state WaitRI. The thread for Transition 2,
however, will sleep for the duration of RI because of the
guard condition x >= RI. In the meanwhile, Transition 3
may happen without such constraint and the corresponding
thread can change the value of cur_loc to WaitVRP.
When the thread for Transition 2 wakes up, checking for
cur_loc fails and Transition 2 is not taken in effect.
2) Checking Timing Constraints:
Testing scenarios: As in the single threaded approach,
we used the test scenarios of Pacing–Pacing, Pacing–
Sensing, and Sending–Pacing and checked whether the properties PropLRI, PropHRI, and PropVRP hold in the code.
Checking method and result: Note that in the template in Listing 2, we also instrumented the perform
verification which does the same checking as in the
single-threaded approach. One difference, however, is that,
1 On the PICos18 OS we are using, threads and semaphores are actually
simplified to tasks and events, respectively.

to avoid printing overhead in the multi-threaded approach,2
we pre-allocated memory locations to arrays for recording
timing information. Printing of the functions is finished later
when monitoring is stopped. In doing so, we can bring the
time spent on monitoring to the minimum amount.
To measure the execution time of one iteration of a thread
(corresponding to the execution time for one transition), we
record the time immediately after the thread has been waken
up, and when an execution of one iteration finishes, another
time value is recorded.
We tested the program with the test scenarios several
times, but repetitive execution did not make much differences because the experiment was conducted in the simulator
environment and random numbers used to simulate heart
beats were predefined ones. Experiment synthesized from
one nominal sample run of this approach is shown in
Table III. We observe from the result that the PropVRP
property holds for all the values, while the PropHRI and
PropLRI properties do not hold.
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Heart Event (ms)
P:1001
S:395
P:1202
S:687
S:1089
P:1202
S:419
S:1184
P:1202
S:642
P:1202
P:1001

VRP
–
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
–
Yes
–
–

LRI
No
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
No

HRI
–
–
No
–
–
No
–
–
No
–
No
–

Table III
C HECKING RESULT OF MULTI - THREADED CODE

Re-checking result: We modified our multi-threaded
code to incorporate the result of our experiment, using 2ms
as the timing tolerance value ∆, and experimented again.
The result is shown in Table IV.
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
12

Heart Event (ms)
S:872
P:1200
S:398
S:1153
S:351
P:1200
P:1000
S:444
P:1200
P:1000
P:999

VRP
Yes
–
Yes
Yes
Yes
–
–
Yes
–
–
–

LRI
–
–
–
–
–
–
Yes
–
–
Yes
Yes

HRI
–
Yes
–
–
–
Yes
–
–
Yes
–
–

Table IV
R ECHECKING RESULT OF MULTI - THREADED CODE

It can be observed from the result that the PropLRI and
PropHRI properties now hold. As is with the single-threaded
approach, we modified the model according to the changes to
the code and verified the properties again. All the properties
were still satisfied by the modified model.
In the worst case, it may be possible that such a timing
tolerance value of ∆ cannot be found. For example, the
smallest timing tolerance value of ∆ may be larger than the
allowed tolerance value from specifications. If this happens,
the implementation of the code should be examined to see
if the underlying coding scheme is sufficient enough for
achieving timing constraints.
V. D ISCUSSION
A. Type of Timing Properties

Timing analysis: According to the above experiment
result, we can see that there is always a delay than expected
pacing time. The maximum delay is bounded in the above
result by 2 milliseconds.
One observation is that, making an event happen at the
exact expected time is not possible, since there is always
a processing delay between the time an event is supposed
to happen and the time that it is actually carried out. This
deviant is unavoidable for any implementations on any real
platforms we use. However, another observation from our
experiment result is that, the deviant values can be bounded.
If we incorporate this bound to the code and make the
events happen earlier, it is possible to reduce the violations
of the desired timing properties. For example, with the
knowledge that all time delays are within 2ms, we can
modify our code such that the events happen 2ms earlier
than expected. This is the idea for the “re-checking” step.
2 Due to limitations of the PICos18 OS, the minimum time resolution
obtainable from the program is 1ms.

From the experiment of property checking in the code,
we found that verification results are highly dependent on
types of timing properties. We dealt with following types
of timing properties: 1) whenever a certain event happens,
a timer value should be greater than or equal to a certain
value, and 2) whenever a certain event happens, a timer value
should be less than or equal to a certain value. Properties
requiring that a specific timer be always greater than or equal
to a certain time limit when an event happens (e.g., VRP
period check) were always satisfied on the code. We did
not put any changes to the code in these satisfied cases.
Properties requiring that a specific timer be always less than
or equal to a certain time limit when an event happens (e.g.,
LRI and HRI period checks) were not satisfied in many
cases. To make sure a desired event occur no later than
the specified time instant, we made guard-checking done
earlier by considering execution time of corresponding code
segments. We considered two types of timing properties in
our approach. More complex types of timing properties need
to be considered in future work.

B. Instrumentation Overhead
Checking properties on the code often requires additional
instrumentation code such as code for evaluating checking
condition and printing. Time overhead from instrumentation
code may sometimes cause the code to fail in satisfying
timing properties. In our pacemaker example, time for the instrumentation code did not affect the code in its satisfaction
of three major timing properties although time delay which
we measured includes overhead time for the instrumentation
code. However, this example does not cover general cases.
Although instrumentation overhead is considered ignorable
as far as it does not harm timing property preservation in
our approach, reducing instrumentation overhead is strongly
preferable. Extensive work has been done in code instrumentation and improving the performance and accuracy of time
profilers based on code instrumentation. Existing techniques
can be applied to our approach to make the ∆ safely tighter.
C. Code Generation Scheme
We showed two different code generation schemes from
timed automata and demonstrated how the proposed approach can be applied to them. Different code structure
can make different impacts on timing properties. Although
significant differences between two code schemes in terms
of timing tolerance, performance, property preservation, etc.
were not found in our case study, we witnessed that the
multi-threaded code scheme has more time uncertainty than
the single thread. We have a plan to analyze and evaluate
different code generation schemes from timed automata.
D. Scalability
The proposed approach includes both manual and automatic operations. Scalability issue may be raised when the
proposed approach is applied to development of complex
real-time software. The proposed development approach
would be much more useful if it is supported by automated
tools. There are many spaces where automated tools can be
used to improve the applicability of this approach to large
real-time software.
Creating a formal model from system specification is
generally done manually. Model checking on the created
model is performed automatically. For the code synthesis,
use of automated tools for code synthesis is highly recommended. However, it is not always easy to find tools fit for
the developer’s purpose because code synthesis for models
is inherently model-dependent and platform-dependent. If
it is the case, automatic code generation using an existing
tool complemented by manual modification or development
of a new tool can be considered. We utilized T IMES and
E LASTIC 2B RICK tools to generate the basis codes from the
timed automata model and modified the generated codes
manually to make them executable in a different hardware
platform in our case study.

Alterations to the model based on code changes have
been made manually in the proposed approach. However,
it is highly possible to automate this alteration process by
implementing backward mapping from the generated code
to the formal model because mapping changes in the code
to changes in the model may not be difficult as far as the
code generation process is systematic.
E. Generalization
The proposed development approach can be applied to
development of general safety-critical real-time software
with different design decisions, although we showed a few
specific decisions in our case study - timed automata as
a modeling language, U PPAAL as a verification tool, stop
watch technique as a timing analysis method, and two
specific methods of code synthesis. As long as the modeling
language captures timing behaviors of the system and the
formal verification tool can check safety timing properties,
other modeling languages and verification tools may also be
used. As long as the code synthesis is systematic and sound,
other synthesis techniques can also be used. Moreover, as
long as the timing analysis method can give information to
find ∆, other timing analysis methods can be used in the
proposed development approach.
VI. R ELATED W ORK
A. Code Generation from Timed Automata
Code generation from state machines in general is a well
studied topic [15]. Specifically, a couple of tools support
generating code from timed automata [11]. The T IMES
tool [14] is designed for modeling and implementation of
embedded systems. Main targets are time/event triggered
systems which can be described as sets of tasks. It supports
code generation from timed automata extended with tasks for
B RICKOS [6] platform. Assuming synchrony hypothesis, the
code synthesis of the T IMES is guaranteed to preserve safety,
schedulability and boundedness properties given those properties have been checked on a system design model prior to
its implementation.
The E LASTIC 2B RICK [16] tool is based on the AASAP
semantics [4]. It takes a simplified version of timed automata
without invariants as its specification language and generates code for B RICKOS platform. The E LASTIC 2B RICK
approach guarantees that safety properties proven correct
with ∆ in the model are preserved in the generated code,
when certain assumptions for the execution time and the
clock precision are satisfied. Neither shared variables among
different automata nor broadcasting communications are
supported by the E LASTIC 2B RICK tool.
B. Timing Analysis on C code
Worst Case Execution Time (WCET) analysis is one of the
commonly used timing analysis techniques. WCET analysis
techniques are categorized into dynamic and static analysis.

Dynamic timing analysis is based on measuring exhaustive
running on program code including profiling, emulating, and
logic analysis. pWCET [17], a dynamic WCET analysis
tool, computes probabilistic execution time bounds. Static
timing analysis is based on analyzing mathematical model
on program code without running program code. Since static
timing analysis rely on mathematical model, it is more
accurate than testing-based dynamic timing analysis. Some
of commercial WCET tools using static timing analysis
techniques are RapiTime [18], Bound-T [19], and aiT [20].
[18] and [20] support WCET analysis for restricted subsets
of ANSI C.
Currently, we are using a rather simple technique to obtain
execution time of the code in the proposed approach. We
have a plan to use existing WCET analysis techniques and
tools to find more rigorous timing tolerances.
VII. C ONCLUSION
We presented a safety-assured development method of a
real-time software. While following model-driven development concept basically, we modeled the real-time system
with timed automata and performed model checking on it.
After generating implementation code systematically from
timed automata model, we checked preservation of properties transferred from model on the implementation code.
When a timing property was violated on the code, we tried
to find a timing tolerance ∆, which can be used to make
the property satisfied by enlarging the corresponding guard
in the code. This ∆ was obtained based on measuring time
deviation from the expected one. In order to confirm that
this ∆ can be safely used, model checking with respect
to all the properties was performed again on the modified
model having corresponding changes. We used a pacemaker
software as our case study to demonstrate how this approach
can be applied to development of real-time software. Theoretical analysis of the proposed approach and comparison of
different code generation schemes are in progress. We also
have a plan to construct assurance cases for our pacemaker
software to figure out how the proposed methodology can
affect construction of assurance cases.
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